Collective Female Labour Supply: Theory and Application * In this paper, we deal with female labour supply in the collective framework. We study married couples and start from the empirical observation that the husband's labour supply is generally fixed at full-time. We then show that, in this case, structural elements of the decision process, such as individual preferences or the rule that determines the intrahousehold distribution of welfare, can be identified if household demand for at least one commodity, together with the wife's labour supply, is observed. These theoretical considerations are followed by an empirical application using French data.
Introduction
Traditionally, the household, as a whole, is considered the elementary decision unit; in particular, consumption and labour supply decisions are modelled as though household members were maximizing a unique utility function under a budget constraint. Nevertheless, this so-called 'unitary'approach has been criticized because, as is generally admitted, a household comprising several adult members does not necessarily behave as a single rational agent. 1 Still another approach is proposed by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 . This author develops a model of labour supply based on a 'collective'representation of household behaviour. In this framework, each person is characterized by speci…c preferences, and decisions are assumed to result in Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes. Then, if consumption is purely private and agents are egoistic, e¢ ciency has two attractive properties. First, household labour supply functions have to satisfy testable restrictions. Second, if these restrictions are satis…ed, some elements of the decision process, such as preferences and the rule that determines the intra-household distribution of welfare, can be retrieved from the observation of the labour supply functions. Moreover, Donni (2003) shows that this theoretical model can be extended to incorporate the possibility of non-participation decisions and nonlinear budget sets. 2 The collective approach turns out to be pro…table, as shown by recent empirical applications. For example, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) closely follow Chiappori's initial framework and …nd, using Canadian data, that the restrictions implied by the collective setting are not rejected. Chiappori et alii (2002) extend this framework to allow for 'distribution factors', de…ned as being any variable that is exogenous with respect to preferences but may in ‡uence the decision process. Using the PSID and choosing the sex ratio and an indicator of divorce legislation as distribution factors, they also …nd that the theoretical restrictions are not rejected.
Unfortunately, these empirical investigations do not account for the fact that, in the majority of developed countries, male labour supply is rigid and largely determined by exogenous constraints. This is a serious problem that was recently addressed by Blundell et alii (2001) . These authors examine United Kingdom data from 1978 to 1993 and remark that, when men work, they nearly always work full-time, while wive's hours of work, on the contrary, vary widely. The theoretical model they develop allows for these essential features: the wife's labour supply is assumed to be continuous whereas the husband's choices are assumed to be discrete (either working full time or not at all). They show that the main conclusions, derived by Chiappori in the initial context, are still valid here. One drawback, however, is that such a di¤erence in spouses' behaviour is completely unexplained. Moreover, the result of identi…ability and testability given by Blundell et alii (2001) holds only if the husband's choice between working full time and not working is free. In particular, it could be seriously misleading if the husband's unemployment, which is due to demand-side constraints, is mistakenly interpreted in empirical studies as a decision to not participate in the labour market. As a matter of fact, the model of Blundell et alii (2001) is probably convenient when the labour market is very competitive since, in this case, a large proportion of non-working men can be explained by free decisions. Nonetheless, the pertinence of this model to the study of female labour supply is certainly more questionable when the labour market is very regulated.
Our objective in this paper is to investigate female labour supply in France, where a high proportion of unemployment in the population can be seen, in all likelihood, as involuntary. 3 To do that, we have to handle the rigidity of the husband's behaviour in a quite di¤erent way. Our starting point follows Blundell et alii (2001) , though. We admit the empirical fact that, for the majority of households, the husband's hours of work are …xed at full-time while the wife's hours of work are spread between zero and the full-time bound. This is at least a good approximation. Now, our approach di¤ers from Blundell et alii (2001) , in that the few husbands who do not work are seen as being constrained by involuntary unemployment. In that case, the large proportion of husbands who work full-time can simply be explained by their preferences between leisure and consumption. The crucial point, then, is that the husband's hours of work, if they do not vary or if they are determined by demand-side constraints, tell us nothing about the decision process or preferences. Consequently, the results given by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 or Blundell et alii (2001) are no longer valid in the present context.
To deal with that, we adopt an alternative approach that is inspired by the literature on collective models of consumption 4 and, to simplify matters, we ignore the case of households with unemployed husbands. That is to say, our theoretical model focusses on households with husbands working full timethe most common situation-and considers the observation of wive's labour supply, together with information given by the structure of household consumption, to identify the most important elements of the decision process and understand how wive's hours of work are determined.
The next steps are then as follows. First, we extend to collective models the theory of household behaviour under rationing, previously developed by Neary and Roberts (1980) for the unitary approach. This is necessary for studying household behaviour when the labour supply of one spouse is …xed at zero or full-time. Second, assuming that the husband's labour supply is …xed, we demonstrate that the main properties of Chiappori's initial model are preserved. In particular, some elements of the intra-household decision process can be identi…ed from the observation of the wife's labour supply function and on one commodity demand function. 5 Third, using a technique based on Blundell et alii (2001) and Donni (2003) , we prove that this model is still identi…able and testable if the wife does not work. This theoretical advance is empirically relevant since it is generally observed that a large number of women do not participate in the labour market. The …nal contribution of this paper is to estimate and test this model using French data for couples in which only the husband is working full-time. In this empirical exploration, we take into account the possibility of non-participation of the wife and estimate a …ve-equation system (one labour supply and four commodity demands). This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the assumptions of our framework and Section 3 presents the main theoretical results. Section 4 provides an analysis of our econometric strategy and Section 5 gives a brief description of the data and the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 4 The main result of this literature is that the intra-household distribution of resources can be retrieved from the observation of a system of commodity demand functions. See Bourguignon et alii (1995) and Ekeland (2002a, 2002b) for the theory, and Browning et alii (1994) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) for empirical applications. 5 A related result was already mentioned in Bourguignon et alii (1995) in the context of demand analysis with constant prices. The identi…cation result that we present in this paper is more general, however, since the price of the wife's leisure is assumed to be variable. 4 2 The Collective Approach
General Framework
We consider only the case of married couples (m and f ) in a single period setting. 6 The wife's and husband's labour supply are respectively denoted by L f and L m with market wages w f and w m . The wife's and husband's demand for commodity n (n = 1; : : : ; N , with N > 2) are respectively denoted by Q f n and Q mn with prices set to one. Non-labour income is denoted by y. For convenience, each spouse's total time endowment is normalized at one 7 and we say that member i (i = m; f ) works full-time if
: : : ; Q iN ) be the vector of member i's consumptions. We adopt the following assumption on preferences.
Assumption A1 Each household member is characterized by speci…c preferences. These can be represented by utility functions of the form: u i (1 L i ; Q i ) that are both strongly concave, in…nitely di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in all their arguments, with lim
The household members are said to be 'egoistic'in the sense that their utility only depends on their own consumption and leisure. However, all the results immediately extend to the case of 'caring' agents, with utilities represented by the form:
where W i ( ) is a strictly increasing function; see Chiappori (1992) on this point. Finally, let us note that the condition on limits in A1 lets us rule out cases in which individual consumption is equal to zero. We implicitly assume that there is no public consumption and no domestic production. The budget set is then written as follows:
(n = 1; : : : ; N and i = f; m) .
We observe that, in surveys, consumption is generally recorded at the household level. We thus assume, in what follows, that only the vector of aggregate consumptions, Q = Q f + Q m , is observed by the econometrician. The main originality of the e¢ ciency approach lies in the fact that household decisions result in Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes and that no additional assumptions are made about the process. This is formally expressed in the following assumption.
Assumption A2 The outcome of the decision process is Pareto e¢ cient; that is, for any wage-income bundle (w f ; w m ; y), the labour-consumption bun-
in the budget set could make both members better o¤.
This assumption has a good deal of intuitive appeal. The household is one of the preeminent examples of a repeated game. Thus, given symmetry of information, it is plausible that agents …nd mechanisms to support e¢ -cient outcomes since cooperation often emerges as a long-term equilibrium of repeated noncooperative relations.
In this theoretical discussion, we suppose that there is no involuntary unemployment. Then, Pareto-e¢ ciency essentially means that there exists a scalar such that household behaviour can be described as a solution to following program:
with respect to budget sets (1) and (2) . The parameter has an obvious interpretation as a 'distribution of power'index. If = 0, then the household behaves as though the wife always gets her way, whereas if = 1; the husband is the e¤ective dictator. Moreover, to obtain well-behaved labour supply and commodity demand functions, we assume that the scalar 2]0; 1[ is a singlevalued and in…nitely di¤erentiable function of w f , w m and y. The underlying idea is that, within a bargaining context, the threat point is expected to depend on non-labour income and the wage that the spouses receive when they work.
Decentralization and Rationing
To begin with, we say that a pair of labour supply functions, L f (w f ; w m ; y) and L m (w f ; w m ; y), together with a pair of systems of commodity demand 
Proof. This is a straightforward application of the First and the Second Theorems of Welfare Economics. See Bourguignon et alii (1995) for example.k
This lemma determines the functional structure of labour supply and commodity demand functions. For an interior solution, we have:
and
where = f and y = m . The functions f ; m ; f n and mn are traditional Marshallian labour supply and commodity demand functions. Speci…-cally, the labour supply functions satisfy Slutsky Positivity:
The wife's share is then called 'sharing rule'. The latter is generally a function of all the exogenous variables.
For handling corner solutions, we must develop a 'collective' theory of household behaviour under rationing. 9 We follow the procedure used by Neary and Roberts (1980) for standard systems of demand functions. When the wife is rationed on the labour market, her actual wage is replaced in commodity demand functions by a shadow wage ! f ; implicitly de…ned by
where f is the level of rationing (equal to zero or one in our model). Thus, the nth commodity demand function becomes:
where the de…nition (6) is used in the second line and f n ? is a 'conditional' commodity demand function in the meaning of Browning and Meghir (1991) . In words, in the case of rationing, an increase in the wife's wage only has an income e¤ect on household consumption. That means that rationing, as in the unitary framework, causes regime switches in commodity demand functions.
We also have the following cases. First, when the husband is rationed on the labour market, the nth commodity demand function becomes:
Second, when both spouses are rationed on the labour market, the nth commodity demand function becomes:
In this case, we obtain the model of pure consumption studied, in particular, by Bourguignon et alii (1995) .
3 Collective Female Labour Supply
Preliminary Considerations
In the collective model of labour supply, initially developed by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , the solutions to ProgrammeP are assumed to be interior. Speci…cally, it is implicitly assumed that (w f ; w m ; y) 2 R; where R is de…ned by
Such a framework, where labour supplies are characterized by (3) and (4), allows us to recover preferences and the outcome of the decision process from the observation of labour supply functions.
In some countries, however, the assumption that both labour supplies freely vary is not appropriate. We often observe, as indicated in the introduction, that the husband's labour supply is …xed at the current upper bound (i.e., L m = 1) for the majority of households and equal to zero for a minority of them. Our framework is hardly consistent with this empirical fact, unless we assume that the husband's unemployment we observe is due to demand-side constraints. This is the idea underlying our approach. We now proceed as follows. First of all, in keeping with the previous section, we focus on the behaviour of households which are not a¤ected by unemployment. Then, we admit that, for unknown reasons, the husband has little taste for leisure and/or is able to obtain a high market wage. This implies, in our setting, that he always chooses the maximum number of hours at his disposal. Formally, assume that (w f ; w m ; y) 2 P; where P is de…ned by
In other words, the theoretical model that follows analyses the household members' desired hours of work, between zero and one, but supposes that the husband always chooses the maximum number of hours available.
useful structural elements of the model. 11 In fact, the observation of the husband's labour supply function does not contain useful information. The idea of this paper is then to use the observation of the structure of consumption to identify the sharing rule and derive testable restrictions.
Identifying the Sharing Rule
First, we assume that only one commodity demand function, together with the wife's labour supply function, is observed. We recall that when the husband's labour supply is …xed at one, these functions are written as:
where the sum of non-labour income and the husband's wage is the 'exogenous' household income. Moreover, under our assumptions, L f (w f ; w m ; y) and Q n (w f ; w m ; y) as well as (w f ; w m ; y) are in…nitely di¤erentiable in all their arguments on int(P ). To simplify derivation of the results, we now introduce the following de…nitions:
We also assume that the functions we consider satisfy the following regularity conditions. The …rst condition obviously implies the absence of income pooling in the wife's labour supply, i.e., the impact of the husband's wage and of nonlabour income on the wife's labour supply are di¤erent. The other conditions are more complicated and not examined here. Quite importantly, however, it can be shown that these conditions exclude the demand function for the 'composite'commodity Z (say) which is de…ned by Z = P N n=1 (Q f n + Q mn ). We can now put forward the next result, which says that some elements of the wife's preferences and the sharing rule can be retrieved.
Proposition 2 Let us assume CR. The functions L f (w f ; w m ; y) and Q n (w f ; w m ; y) are observed. Then, under R1, the sharing rule can be retrieved on P up to a constant . Speci…cally, its derivatives on int(P ) are given by Moreover, for each choice of , the wife's preferences between total consumption and leisure are uniquely de…ned. Finally, the individual nth commodity demand function can also be recovered up to a constant n .
Proof. See the Appendix.k
We brie ‡y sketch the basic steps of the proof. The idea is that changes in either non-labour income or the husband's wage can only a¤ect the wife's labour supply insofar as her share of exogenous income, as de…ned by the sharing rule, is modi…ed. This means that any simultaneous change in nonlabour income and the husband's wage that leaves the wife's labour supply unchanged must keep her share constant as well. From this idea, it is possible to measure the e¤ect of exogenous income on commodity demand, keeping the wife's share unchanged. This yields the husband's Engel curve, which in turn allows us to derive other structural elements, like the sharing rule, by di¤erentiation of the Engel curve and resolution of the resulting system of partial di¤erential equations.
Testing Collective Rationality
The next result gives a set of testable restrictions that the wife's labour supply function and the nth commodity demand function must satisfy.
Proposition 3 Let us assume CR. The functions L
f (w f ; w m ; y) and Q n (w f ; w m ; y) are observed. Then, under R1,
2) Proof. See the Appendix.k
These restrictions provide a joint test of collective rationality under speci…c assumptions, namely, egoistic (or caring) agents and the absence of public consumption and domestic production. The …rst condition corresponds to Slutsky Positivity translated in the collective approach. The second condition results from the separability property of the behavioural functions: the husband's wage and non-labour income a¤ect household behaviour only through the individual shares.
More can be obtained when the demand for several commodities, rather than a single one, is observed. This is formally expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let us assume CR. The functions L f (w f ; w m ; y), Q n 1 (w f ; w m ; y) and Q n 2 (w f ; w m ; y) are observed. Then, under R1,
for any (w f ; w m ; y) 2 int(P ).
The di¤erence with the case of only one commodity is that the constraints here are based on a second, rather than a third order partial di¤erential equation, which is more restrictive.
Extension: The Wife' s Rationing
One of the main limitations of the preceding results is the assumption that the wife is always free to vary the hours she works. Indeed, many wives choose not to work at all or to work full-time, two cases ruled out in the earlier discussion. In this section, we thus consider the wife's participation decision. The results can easily be extended to the converse case of working full-time, though.
First, we note that the existence of a well-behaved participation frontier does not stem from the theoretical construct as in standard labour supply models, but must be postulated. 13 Therefore, we use the following assumption.
Assumption R2 There exists a positive function (w m ; y) de…ned on R ++ R such that the wife does not participate in the labour market if and only if w f 6 (w m ; y).
We also assume that the wife's market wage w f is observed even when she does not work. Of course, this is very restrictive but, in practice, the market wage can be estimated by an auxiliary equation. 14 We thus suppose that (w f ; w m ; y) 2 N where N is de…ned by
We also de…ne I f(w m ; y)j(w f ; w m ; y) 2 N and w f = (w m ; y)g. In Figure  1 , the sets P , N and I are illustrated in a two-dimensional plane (i.e., for a …xed y). We see, in this …gure, that the wife does not work when her wage is below its reservation value (given by the curve in bold) and she works fulltime when her wage is above some critical value (given by the upper curve). 15 We can say the same for the husband. We …nally assume that we observe the nth commodity demand function, given by
and the participation frontier, de…ned as w f = (w m ; y). Under our assumptions, this commodity demand function and the participation frontier are in…nitely di¤erentiable on int(N ) and I, respectively. Moreover, along the participation frontier, the nth commodity demand function can be written as follows:
. 13 The idea is that, when the wife is indi¤erent between working and not working, a small increase in her wage has a substitution e¤ect-as in the standard model-but also an income e¤ect through the sharing rule. The former is necessarily positive but the latter can be positive or negative. See Blundell et alii (2001) and Donni (2003) for a formal discussion.
14 Still, the treatment of this issue may raise very complicated problems which are not addressed here. See Blundell et alii (2001) for a …rst investigation. 15 The wife's (husband's) labour supply, if it is backward bending, may fall below 1 for some wages which are particularly high, but this feature is not represented in Figure 1 . The next result says, …rst, that the sharing rule can be retrieved on N up to a constant and, second, that testable restrictions are generated. Proof. See the Appendix.
At this stage, some clari…cations are necessary. First, the proof of this proposition does not require complete speci…cation of the wife's underlying labour supply, but only of the participation frontier. This result is useful since surveys generally contain information about the employment status of household members but not necessarily about the number of hours of work. The wife's wage must be observed, though. Second, considering additional commodity demands obviously creates new constraints. These are not formally examined in this paper. In fact, commodity demand functions with 'double rationing'receive great attention in Bourguignon et alii (1995) . In particular, these authors show that a triplet of commodity demand functions is su¢ cient to identify the sharing rule. By comparison, the result above requires only one commodity demand function and the participation frontier. Finally, the results of Proposition 5 complete those of Proposition 2 and ensure that the sharing rule is identi…ed on the entire set of interest to us, P [ N .
Econometric Analysis
In this section, we consider empirical implementation of the model described above. First, we propose a functional form for labour supply and the system of commodity demands. Second, we introduce stochastic terms and derive the log-likelihood function.
Functional Form
In this section and those that follow, we adopt the following conventions : w f h denotes the wife's hourly wage in household h, w mh the husband's hourly wage, y h monthly non-labour income, L f h the observed number of hours worked per month, Q n h expenditure on commodity n per month, and T the (legal or socio-cultural) maximum number of hours per month.
Labour Supply and Commodity Demands
In order to estimate and test this model, we adopt the linear functional form, initially proposed by Hausman (1981) , for the wife's latent labour supply. If we ignore the stochastic terms at this stage, we have:
where L f h is the wife's latent number of worked hours per month. The wife is rationed on the labour market if the latent variable is either greater than T or less than 0:
Moreover, the intercept h is assumed to depend on a set of variables:
where z jf h are socio-demographic characteristics relevant for explaining the wife's behaviour (e.g., the wife's age, the region of residence, the number of children). Finally, Slutsky Positivity is globally ful…lled if and only if > max(0; T ).
This speci…cation has several desirable properties. First, the linear form for labour supply has frequently been used in empirical studies and is suitable for French data; see Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) for another application. 16 Second, the wife's preferences between leisure and consumption have a well-known form; see Hausman (1981) . They are described by the following indirect utility function:
Third, and more importantly, this speci…cation permits us to have a closed form for shadow wages which are used to compute rationed commodity demand functions. Of course, the main limitation of the linear functional form is its lack of ‡exibility; in particular, it implies, when Slutsky Positivity is imposed, that the labour supply curve is upward sloping everywhere. We now consider the functional form of the commodity demands. We assume that, when 0 < L f h < T , the nth commodity demand function is quadratic, 17 as follows:
According to our theory, this functional form switches regimes in the presence of rationing. Two cases must be considered. First, when L f h 6 0, we compute a shadow wage as follows:
and introduce this expression into the nth commodity demand to obtain:
Second, when L f h > T , the shadow wage becomes :
and we introduce this expression into the nth commodity demand. Since this substitution also in ‡uences the shadow income, we obtain:
This way of dealing with rationing implies that commodity demand functions are continuous everywhere (in particular, along the frontiers where the regime switches) and an increase in the wife's wage, in the case of rationing, only has an income e¤ect on consumption. Finally, since individual intercepts cannot be both identi…ed, we reset the parameters a n h = a n f h + a n mh with a n h = P J j=1 a n j z jh , where z jh are socio-demographic variables relevant for explaining the spouses' behaviour.
The Sharing Rule and the Collective Constraints
As in Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Blundell et alii (2001), we adopt a linear speci…cation for the sharing rule:
Although the sign of the parameters is not formally determined by the model above, intuition suggests that 0 < B < C < 1:
However, the coe¢ cient A can be either positive or negative since its sign results from two opposite e¤ects; see Chiappori (1992) . To show that, let us assume that the wife's wage rises. If she works, the income of the household, as a whole, should increase and both members should bene…t from that. At the same time, however, the wife improves her bargaining power. This last e¤ect should have a negative impact on the husband's share. All in all, the negative impact of the wife's wage on the husband's share likely predominates if the welfare gains resulting from the wage increase are small enough (notably if the wife does not work). 18 Speci…cally, if we introduce the sharing rule (12) into the utility function (11), di¤erentiate with respect to w f h ; and use (10), we can demonstrate that the wife bene…ts from an increase in her wage only if
This condition may be satis…ed when A is negative, if L f h is large enough.
To test collective rationality, we must derive the unconstrained model that corresponds to the present speci…cation. To do that, we adopt the approach followed by Browning et alii (1994) . The crucial point here is that there is an equivalence between collective rationality and the existence of a single sharing rule in all the equations (as stated by Lemma 1) . Moreover, at least one commodity demand function, together with the wife's labour supply function, is required to identify the sharing rule. Let us write the sharing rule as follows:
where = C=B: The idea behind the identi…cation, transposed to this functional form, is that can be identi…ed from estimation of the wife's labour supply function. Then, knowing , the estimation of one commodity demand function (say n = 1, without loss of generality) allows one to identify A and B. In addition, each extra commodity demand function generates a pair of overidentifying restrictions. 19 Thus, the strategy for testing collective rationality consists in writing the sharing rule as follows:
for each additional commodity demand, and checking the equalities :
A n = A and B n = B, for any n > 1. This comes down to checking that the sharing rule is the same in all the equations.
Stochastic Speci…cation and the Likelihood Function
We have to make some allowance for stochastic terms in the right-hand side of these equations. There are several sources of such randomness: unobservable heterogeneity in preferences or in the sharing rule and optimization/measurement errors in observations. The most satisfactory treatment would be to allow for each of these and to develop a full stochastic model (see Blundell et alii (2001) for such an attempt in a less complicated context). However, this would entail the introduction of a large number of stochastic terms and make the model almost intractable. More importantly, the distribution of these terms is not necessarily identi…able. Hence we adopt a much more conventional approach of simply adding error terms to each equation:
h for the wife's labour supply and " n h for the nth commodity demand. We assume that the vector ( h ; " 
where is a matrix of free parameters and 0 and 1 are identity matrices with free parameters instead of zeros in the …rst column. This speci…cation is a convenient approximation when stochastic terms in the wife's labour supply result from a mix of unobservable taste heterogeneity and optimization/measurement errors (it is a straightforward generalization of the approach of Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986) to the case of more than two equations). 20 This re ‡ects the fact that, in the case of rationing, the taste heterogeneity factor in the wife's labour supply is 'introduced'into commodity demands through shadow wages.
These assumptions, with the relationships de…ned above, directly yield a distribution on hours of work and commodity quantities. There are three regimes. Wives are either unrationed, rationed at 0; or rationed at T . Let Similarly, the contribution for wives who are rationed at T is given by
Finally, combining these expressions provides the log-likelihood function of the econometric model:
A critical assumption in the above analysis concerns the observability of the wage for all wives. This is, of course, not the case for unemployed women. Our approach is thus based on the construction of a …tted valueŵ f h for the wage using censored regression techniques and interpretsŵ f h as the wage faced by all workers.
Data and Empirical Results
In this section we present the main results. First we describe the data set, then we give the estimated coe¢ cients and the statistics for the test of the collective constraints. From the original sample, we …rst select a subsample of married couples with, at most, one child between 3 and 18 years old. Children, and expenditures on them, may indeed be considered public commodities for both parents, whereas the model considered above only allows for private commodities. Moreover, children are expected to increase problems related to household production. On the other hand, considering only childless couples restricts the size of our sample considerably.
The Data
We next restrict the sample to couples in which husband and wife (if they are working) are not self-employed. 21 These selection rules and the exclusion of observations with missing data leave us with a total of 1078 observations. The distribution of working hours in this sample is described in Table 1 . However, according to our theory, the sample we use in the empirical analysis must contain only couples that are not a¤ected by involuntary unemployment and in which the husband works full-time (i.e., arbitrarily de…ned by monthly labour supply above 140 hours). Hence, we remove 200 extra observations and obtain a …nal sample of 878 households. 22 Conditioning the sample on full-time working husbands may, in principle, induce a selectivity bias. However, the number of households in which the husband does not work full-time is small. In addition, it is predominantly made up of job seekers (even if this may hide a voluntary decision) and one may reasonably believe that the problem of selection is less important in this case. In particular, it may be completely negligible if unemployment indiscriminately strikes any household regardless of the wife's and husband's characteristics. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the …nal sample. The wife's labour supply is the number of hours worked per month. It is computed by multiplying the number of reported weekly hours by 4.2. Expenditures on nondurable commodities are recorded in the survey in diaries covering two-week 21 Some occupations for which the number of worked hours can hardly be measured (scientists, artists, teachers, soldiers and so on) are also excluded from our sample. 22 We also remove households with one member whose monthly labour supply is above 220 hours from our sample. This makes up about 5% of the sample.
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Husband Table 1 : Distribution of Working Hours in the Intermediate Sample periods and extrapolated to the year. 23 In the empirical application, we calculate monthly expenditures on food (at home and away), clothing (for husbands, wives, and children), recreation (including books, disks, vacations and sporting goods) and transportation (excluding purchases of vehicles) respectively. Practically, there may be problems due to the infrequency of purchases. However, this must not be overestimated because the commodities that we consider are aggregated and the lumpiness in these expenditures is minimal.
The wife's hourly wage is computed as the monthly wage net of payroll deductions but including overtime, bonuses, pensions, and a monetary evaluation of bene…ts in kind, divided by the number of hours worked. This wage is then replaced for all observations by the …tted values derived from a conventional wage equation estimated for participating wives with a correction for selection bias. 24 The husband's hourly wage is de…ned in the same way as the wife's hourly wage. Monthly non-labour income includes various transfers and income from di¤erent types of assets (including child bene…ts) and the virtual income of home owner-occupiers, certainly the most important asset return, from which the repayment of debts and mortgages is subtracted. This virtual income is not directly observed but computed as the …tted value of an equation estimated on renting households.
One …nal point must be stressed. The French labour market is charac- 23 Expenditures on clothing are recorded over a two-month period, but this di¤erence with other nondurables is not taken into account. 24 The results of this regression are described in Appendix B. terized by extensive regulation of hours of work. Labour laws …x an exogenous norm for companies and the number of overtime hours remains strictly bounded. In 1984-85, this norm was generally equal to 39 hours per week; each hour of work over that …gure can be interpreted as overtime (almost all the variability in the husband's labour supply stems from overtime hours, as shown in Table 1 ). If we multiply 39 hours by 4.2 and round down, we obtain 160 hours per month. This …gure is naturally interpreted as the upper bound that the household members face. We thus set T = 160 in the log-likelihood function. 25 
Parameter Estimates
We include four (three) preference factors in the commodity demands (wife's labour supply); this is the end result of a preliminary analysis which excluded some variables (such as several dummies for the region of residence). Ultimately, we estimated 49 structural parameters; 6 for the wife's labour supply, 10 for each commodity demand, and 3 for the sharing rule. Before beginning our investigation of these estimates, we …rst check the parametric restrictions implied by collective rationality. To do that, we use the unconstrained model previously derived and compute the statistics for the score test. This statistic, which follows a 2 distribution with 6 degrees of freedom, is equal to 6.660 with a p-value of 0.353. In other words, the data that we consider do not reject the e¢ ciency hypothesis. This con…rms the test previously performed with the same data by Bourguignon et alii (1993) .
The estimates are presented in Tables 3 and 4 . We note that only 12 (19) parameters are statistically signi…cant at the 5 (10)% level. That is mediocre but can be explained, at least partially, by the small size of our sample. 26 Fortunately, however, some important parameters are quite precisely estimated. Let us …rst consider the wife's labour supply. All the coe¢ cients have the expected sign (except, perhaps, the regional dummy), and Slutsky Positivity is globally satis…ed: The wage coe¢ cient is signi…cant and positive; its value Table 4 : FIML Parameter Estimates of the Sharing Rule is compatible with previous studies using French data (e.g., Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) ). The share coe¢ cient is negative but not very signi…cant. However, when it is compared with values obtained from standard models of labour supply, it seems excessively large: a one thousand franc increase in the wife's share reduces the wife's labour supply by 90 hours. There are two explanations for this surprising result. Firstly, the collective model (and the interpretation of its parameters) is simply di¤erent from the unitary one. More precisely, the explanatory variable in the collective model is a share of exogenous income whereas, in the unitary model, it is all exogenous income. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the estimates are very di¤erent from what we generally obtain. Secondly, the number of hours worked is assumed to have an upper bound, …xed at 160. This implies, in particular, that the e¤ect of an increase in the wife's share here is not necessarily 'e¤ective' because she may be constrained at the upper (or the lower) bound.
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We do not dwell on the estimated parameters of the commodity demands since these cannot be directly interpreted. Still, it is worth remarking that, in these equations, the parameters for the husband's demands are fairly well estimated (three of them are signi…cant at the 5% level) in comparison with those for the wife's demands. A possible explanation is suggested in the proof of Proposition 2. In this proof, the identi…cation of the husband's Engel curves is shown to rely on the …rst derivatives of the functions that are observed. The wife's Engel curves are then derived from the husband's and are based on second-order derivatives. They are expected to be less precisely estimated.
As for the control variables, let us note that the child dummy is significant (with a positive sign) in the food equation while the Paris dummy is signi…cant (with a negative sign) in the transportation equation. On the other hand, the wife's age is signi…cant (with a negative sign) in the clothing and the transportation equation.
We now turn to the estimated parameters of the sharing rule. Even if they are not signi…cant at the 5% level, their standard deviation is relatively small. By comparison, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) , who use the husband's labour supply to identify the sharing rule, yield standard deviations for structural parameters that are much greater. 28 The estimates in Table  5 can be interpreted as follows. First, a one thousand franc increase in the wife's potential earnings (for a 160-hour week of work) decreases the wife's share by 281 francs. This means that the wife partially transfers her gains in utility to her husband. It can be shown, using (13) , that the wife bene…ts from an increase in wage only if her monthly labour supply is greater than 45 hours. Second, a one thousand franc increase in the husband's earnings increases the wife's share by only 122 francs. That is, only a small part of the husband's earnings goes to the wife. This explains why the share coe¢ cient in the wife's labour supply is unusually large (in absolute value) compared to estimates given by unitary models. Third, a one thousand franc increase in non-labour income increases the wife's share by 392 francs and the husband's share by 608 francs. Blundell et alii (2001) and Chiappori et alii (2002) provide estimates of the same order for the parameters of the sharing rule. These estimated parameters can also be used to test the hypothesis of pooling of the exogenous incomes. The latter implies that the husband's wage and non-labour income have the same impact on the sharing rule. The estimate of the di¤erence B C is equal to 0:270, with a standard deviation of 0:154 and a p-value of 0.079. Therefore, the income pooling hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level (but not at the 5% level). This could explain why most parameters are not very precisely estimated, since the absence of income pooling is required for identi…cation of the parameters, as shown by R1.
We …nally consider the estimates of the wage elasticities (evaluated at the average values of the sample when the wife is unrationed on the labour market); they are presented in Table 5. 29 To be precise, this Table 5 : Income and wage elasticities (at the average point of the sample) 'reduced form'elasticities which mix the parameters of the Marshallian demand and supply functions and those of the sharing rule. For example, the elasticity " of the wife's labour supply with respect to the wife's wage is de…ned by
where w f h and L f h are sample means. These elasticities have the advantage of being comparable with those of unitary models. First, for the labour supply, the husband's and wife's wage elasticities are respectively equal to -0.7 and 2.7. In terms of absolute value, they are about double the estimates obtained by Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) . However, this is doubtlessly due to our speci…cation with an upper bound for the wife's labour supply.
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Second, for the commodity demands, the elasticities are in line with intuition. They seem small because they are computed with respect to wages instead of total household income, as usual. The most remarkable fact here is the di¤erence between the husband's and wife's wage elasticity of the demand for transportation expenditures. It probably re ‡ects the fact that the demand for transportation dramatically depends on the employment status.
Conclusion
In this paper, we start from the assumption that the husband's hours of work are …xed at a legal maximum and we consider the wife's labour supply and household commodity demands in a uni…ed framework. We …rst show is not necessarily positive. 30 In preliminary investigations, we estimated this model without such an upper bound. The elasticities obtained were very close to those in Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) .
that structural elements of the decision process can be identi…ed with the observation of a single commodity demand function. Second, we generate a set of conditions that can be used to test the collective setting. Finally, we conclude with an empirical illustration using French data. These empirical results show that the structural parameters describing the intra-household decision process and the husband's behaviour are fairly well estimated.
The rigidity of the husband's labour supply is certainly a good approximation for numerous countries. However, the validity of our method for dealing with this rigidity, compared to that in Blundell et alii (2001) , is an empirical issue. We conjecture, nevertheless, that the approach we advocate is preferable for investigating female labour supply in France, where the labour market is characterized by many job seekers.
Nevertheless, several theoretical extensions (e.g., …xed costs of participation, nonlinear income taxation, or involuntary unemployment) are necessary to properly assess the present setting. Above all, future research should concentrate on the stochastic speci…cation and the functional form that we have adopted. Speci…cally, the linearity of the wife's labour supply is certainly a severe limitation. One serious problem here is that a more ‡exible speci…ca-tion does not allow us to recover a closed form for the shadow wages used to incorporate rationing in the model.
A List of Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If we di¤erentiate the wife's labour supply function (3) with respect to y and w m and eliminate
Then we use this equation to di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand function along the locus de…ned by d = 0. We simplify and obtain the husband's Engel curve:
If we di¤erentiate this expression again with respect to y, w m and w f , we obtain:
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Solving this system of partial di¤erential equations with (14) yields:
To retrieve
, we di¤erentiate the wife's labour supply function with respect to y, w m and w f , use (18) , and rearrange to obtain :
Similarly, we can di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand function with respect to y, w m and w f , use (18) , and rearrange to obtain: Finally, knowing the sharing rule allows us to write down the wife's actual budget constraint and her preferences can be computed in the usual way. k
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
If we introduce the derivatives of the wife's labour supply function, given by (20) , in the Slutsky Positivity condition, we obtain the …rst condition in the statement of the proposition. If we di¤erentiate (19) with respect to y, w m and w f , and simplify, we obtain the second condition. k
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
If we consider any pair of commodity demand functions, say n 1 and n 2 ; we have a corresponding pair of systems of equations (15)- (17). If we simplify, we obtain the condition in the statement of the proposition. k
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds in stages. We prove that: (A) the sharing rule can be retrieved on the participation frontier, (B) this identi…cation can be extended on int(N ); and (C) testable restrictions are generated. 
Then we use this expression and di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand function along the direction d = 0. We obtain the husband's Engel curve:
We di¤erentiate this expression again to obtain: 
Finally, using (21) and solving this system yields: 
From standard theorems of the partial di¤erential equation theory (e.g., John (1983)), the partial di¤erential equation (25) together with the speci…cation of the sharing rule on the boundary completely determines the wife's share for any (w f ; w m ; y) 2 N , provided that a regularity condition is satis…ed. First, let us remark that the partial di¤erential equation (25) ). Now, the condition is that the vector u is tangent to the participation frontier. Since the equation of this frontier is w f (w m ; y) and given that, on the frontier, Q coincides withQ n , this condition becomes : Q n wm 6 =Q n y . Formally, this result is local rather than global and additional conditions are required to identify the sharing rule on the entire set N . C) Constraints: Di¤erentiating (24) with respect to y and w m and simplifying yields the condition in the statement of the proposition. k
B The Wage Equation
The wage equation includes, among the explanatory variables, the wife's education (measured in years), the square and the cube of this variable, the wife's age, a cross-term of education and age, dummies for the wife's nationality (equal to one if it is di¤erent from French), for the region (Rural and Paris) and for households with a telephone and an indicator of the labour market tension. The latter is de…ned as: log number of job o¤ers by …rms number of job demands by individuals for each French department. Several variables in the right-hand side of the market wage regression are excluded from the empirical model of household behaviour. One important point is that, in order to obtain a greater precision, the wage equation is estimated with a large sample (1769 observations) which also includes households with more than one child. We see in Table 3 that all the parameters are very signi…cant (with the expected sign). In principle, this permits identi…cation of the e¤ect of the wife's wage since some of the variables in the wage equation are excluded from the collective model in the main text. The coe¢ cient of determination is, however, quite small. 
